Data verification using enclave attestation

ABSTRACT

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to receive untrusted input data at an enclave in an electronic device, isolate the untrusted input data from at least a portion of the enclave, communicate at least a portion of the untrusted data to an integrity verification module using an attestation channel, and receive data integrity verification of the untrusted input data from the integrity verification module. The integrity verification module can perform data integrity attestation functions to verify the untrusted data and the data integrity attestation functions include a data attestation policy and a whitelist.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This disclosure relates in general to the field of information security,and more particularly, to data verification using enclave attestation.

BACKGROUND

The field of network security has become increasingly important intoday's society. The Internet has enabled interconnection of differentcomputer networks all over the world. In particular, the Internetprovides a medium for exchanging data between different users connectedto different computer networks via various types of client devices.While the use of the Internet has transformed business and personalcommunications, it has also been used as a vehicle for maliciousoperators to gain unauthorized access to computers and computer networksand for intentional or inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information.

Malicious software (“malware”) that infects a host computer may be ableto perform any number of malicious actions, such as stealing sensitiveinformation from a business or individual associated with the hostcomputer, propagating to other host computers, and/or assisting withdistributed denial of service attacks, sending out spam or maliciousemails from the host computer, etc. Hence, significant administrativechallenges remain for protecting computers and computer networks frommalicious and inadvertent exploitation by malicious software.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

To provide a more complete understanding of the present disclosure andfeatures and advantages thereof, reference is made to the followingdescription, taken in conjunction with the accompanying figures, whereinlike reference numerals represent like parts, in which:

FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram of a communication system for dataverification using enclave attestation in accordance with an embodimentof the present disclosure;

FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of a portion of a communicationsystem for data verification using enclave attestation in accordancewith an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 3 is a simplified flowchart illustrating potential operations thatmay be associated with the communication system in accordance with anembodiment;

FIG. 4 is a simplified flowchart illustrating potential operations thatmay be associated with the communication system in accordance with anembodiment;

FIG. 5 is a simplified flowchart illustrating potential operations thatmay be associated with the communication system in accordance with anembodiment;

FIG. 6 is a simplified flowchart illustrating potential operations thatmay be associated with the communication system in accordance with anembodiment;

FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating an example computing system thatis arranged in a point-to-point configuration in accordance with anembodiment;

FIG. 8 is a simplified block diagram associated with an example ARMecosystem system on chip (SOC) of the present disclosure; and

FIG. 9 is a block diagram illustrating an example processor core inaccordance with an embodiment.

The FIGURES of the drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale, as theirdimensions can be varied considerably without departing from the scopeof the present disclosure.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS Example Embodiments

FIG. 1 is a simplified block diagram of a communication system for dataverification using enclave attestation in accordance with an embodimentof the present disclosure. Communication system 10 a can include anelectronic device 12 a, a server 14, and a cloud 16. Electronic device12 a can include an enclave 20 a, an untrusted application 24, and anintegrity verification module 26 a. Enclave 20 a can include a trustedapplication 22. Integrity verification module 26 a can include an inputdata attestation library 30. Enclave 20 a can be coupled to integrityverification module 26 a using an attestation channel 28 a. Server 14can include an integrity verification module 26 b. Enclave 20 a can becoupled to integrity verification module 26 b in server 14 using anattestation channel 28 b. Cloud 16 can include can include an integrityverification module 26 c. Enclave 20 a can be coupled to integrityverification module 26 c in cloud 16 using an attestation channel 28 c.Enclave 20 a can be a trusted execution environment (TEE). Attestationchannels can 28 a, 28 b, and 28 c can be secure communication channels.

In example embodiments, communication system 10 a (and 10 b discussedbelow) can be configured to include a system to provide dataverification using enclave attestation and to perform attestation ofdata input values to an enclave. A remote enclave verification servercan apply a data integrity policy that can be updated dynamically tocontinually monitor attacks on input data. Communication system 10 a(and 10 b) can use an attestation channel to perform data integrityattestation functions and to provision a data integrity attestationpolicy where the policy is accessible to the enclave. Untrusted inputdata (e.g., data from untrusted application 24) can be isolated prior touse by the enclave application (e.g., trusted application 22) and a dataintegrity verification can be performed either locally using a localintegrity verification module or remotely using a remote integrityverification module. Integrity verification module can be configured touse a library that can enable data range checks, data type checks, datascans for embedded code or other malware, etc.

Elements of FIG. 1 may be coupled to one another through one or moreinterfaces employing any suitable connections (wired or wireless), whichprovide viable pathways for network (e.g., network 18) communications.Additionally, any one or more of these elements of FIG. 1 may becombined or removed from the architecture based on particularconfiguration needs. Communication system 10 a (and 10 b) may include aconfiguration capable of transmission control protocol/Internet protocol(TCP/IP) communications for the transmission or reception of packets ina network. Communication system 10 a (and 10 b) may also operate inconjunction with a user datagram protocol/IP (UDP/IP) or any othersuitable protocol where appropriate and based on particular needs.

For purposes of illustrating certain example techniques of communicationsystem 10 a (and 10 b), it is important to understand the communicationsthat may be traversing the network environment. The followingfoundational information may be viewed as a basis from which the presentdisclosure may be properly explained. The term “enclave” is inclusive ofa trusted execution environment (TEE) and is a protected region ofmemory that is typically only accessible by the enclave itself orthrough a trusted services application program interface. Generally,other processes cannot read, write, or otherwise access the data storedin the enclave and the enclave allows a trusted application to beprotected during execution.

In current systems, an untrusted loader can install code into theenclave and enclave contents (e.g., loaded code) can be verifiedremotely using attestation. The remote verifier must have a whitelistwith which to evaluate the trustworthiness of the code and assign anattestation value. However, the enclave may still be vulnerable toattack during execution when data input to the enclave is used toexploit code weaknesses or to compromise the integrity of the enclaveprotected data. The enclave designers anticipated the potential foruntrusted data input sources by enabling the enclave to use an enclavespecific key that may be used to establish a secure communicationschannel to an input source. Typically, an out-of-band method is requiredto establish trust in the input source. However, it is still possiblefor the input source to be rogue because in practice, enclaves aredeployed in heterogeneous environments containing a mix of enclave awareand enclave ignorant systems. What is needed is a system and method ofdata integrity verification using an enclave attestation and a secureattestation communication channel.

A communication system for data verification using enclave attestation,as outlined in FIG. 1, can resolve these issues (and others). Incommunication system 10 a of FIG. 1, to perform data verification usingenclave attestation, the system can be configured to include anintegrity verification module (e.g., integrity verification module 26 a,26 b, or 26 c) and APIs and logic for instrumenting an enclaveapplication with input data attestation services. The integrityverification module can use a TEE channel for initial attestation whereinput data may be given to a server (e.g., server 14) or cloud services(e.g., cloud 16) for analysis. Application specific or domain specificpolicies may be used by the server or cloud services as part of theanalysis. Alternatively, the policy, or a portion of the policy, may beprovisioned to a local integrity verification module where input dataintegrity and range checking can be performed locally within theenclave.

Input data instrumentation can be application specific. For example, anapplication may expect input values that are only even numbers. The dataattestation policy may specify this constraint, or other similarlyapplication specific constraints. Input data checking can be moregeneric as well. For example, a data attestation policy may requireinput data to be within the range of a 32-bit or 64-bit integer. Inputdata checking may also involve sophisticated analysis designed to detectcode blocks disguised as data. For example, a simple java scriptapplication may be encoded as an input string such as a person's name orplace of residence. The integrity verification module can analyze thestring for patterns, characteristic of code, scripts, etc. In exampleswhere it would be more efficient to process data integrity checks on theelectronic device, the data attestation policy may be provisioned overthe attestation channel to the electronic device. Local processing mayoccur and the result of the processing may be reported back over theattestation channel.

Enclave applications can anticipate that enclaves will only connect totrusted input sources using an encrypted channel or a dedicatedout-of-band channel. Communication system 10 a can allow untrusted inputto occur without compromising the integrity of enclave code. Forexample, enclave applications may be written to perform local or remoterange checking and other data integrity checks. In addition, anelectronic device can use an attestation channel to perform dataintegrity checks on a remote server or cloud, to perform integritychecks on a local enclave using a dynamically provisioned policy. Also,results of local integrity checks can be reported over the attestationchannel. Static analysis of the enclave application can establishwhether or not the input data libraries are being used. Normalattestation establishes that an un-tampered application is loaded intothe enclave. Code path instrumentation can be used by an integrityverification service (e.g., integrity verification module 26 a, 26 b or26 c) to assist in construction of a policy that may be used to focusinput data verification checking.

In an example implementation, an untrusted application (e.g., untrustedapplication 24) inputs untrusted data to an enclave application. Theuntrusted data may exceed buffer size limits, violate data typing rules,may contain attack code, etc. A trusted application (e.g., trustedapplication 22) in the enclave that includes or has access to an inputdata attestation library intercepts the untrusted data before otherparts of the enclave may access it. The untrusted data is forwarded toan integrity verification module using an attestation channel where dataintegrity analysis checks can be performed. The data integrity analysischecks can include, but are not limited to, data range and typechecking, data values checking, and data content scanning that mayinclude scans for embedded code or script. If the untrusted data isverified, the verified (and possibly sanitized) data is returned to theenclave for processing.

In an embodiment, a verification policy can be provisioned to theenclave application that includes or has access to the data attestationlibrary where some or all of the data integrity verifications can beapplied. The policy may be provisioned using the attestation channel.The verification results may be communicated to a server or cloudservices where an auditing check can be performed and the results loggedfor analyses.

Turning to the infrastructure of FIG. 1, communication system 10 a (and10 b) in accordance with an example embodiment is shown. Generally,communication system 10 a (and 10 b) can be implemented in any type ortopology of networks. Network 18 represents a series of points or nodesof interconnected communication paths for receiving and transmittingpackets of information that propagate through communication system 10 a(and 10 b). Network 18 offers a communicative interface between nodes,and may be configured as any local area network (LAN), virtual localarea network (VLAN), wide area network (WAN), wireless local areanetwork (WLAN), metropolitan area network (MAN), Intranet, Extranet,virtual private network (VPN), and any other appropriate architecture orsystem that facilitates communications in a network environment, or anysuitable combination thereof, including wired and/or wirelesscommunication.

In communication system 10 a (and 10 b), network traffic, which isinclusive of packets, frames, signals, data, etc., can be sent andreceived according to any suitable communication messaging protocols.Suitable communication messaging protocols can include a multi-layeredscheme such as Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, or anyderivations or variants thereof (e.g., Transmission ControlProtocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), user datagram protocol/IP(UDP/IP)). Additionally, radio signal communications over a cellularnetwork may also be provided in communication system 10 a (and 10 b).Suitable interfaces and infrastructure may be provided to enablecommunication with the cellular network.

The term “packet” as used herein, refers to a unit of data that can berouted between a source node and a destination node on a packet switchednetwork. A packet includes a source network address and a destinationnetwork address. These network addresses can be Internet Protocol (IP)addresses in a TCP/IP messaging protocol. The term “data” as usedherein, refers to any type of binary, numeric, voice, video, textual, orscript data, or any type of source or object code, or any other suitableinformation in any appropriate format that may be communicated from onepoint to another in electronic devices and/or networks. Additionally,messages, requests, responses, and queries are forms of network traffic,and therefore, may comprise packets, frames, signals, data, etc.

In an example implementation, electronic device 12 a, server 14, andcloud 16 are network elements, which are meant to encompass networkappliances, servers, routers, switches, gateways, bridges, loadbalancers, processors, modules, or any other suitable device, component,element, or object operable to exchange information in a networkenvironment. Network elements may include any suitable hardware,software, components, modules, or objects that facilitate the operationsthereof, as well as suitable interfaces for receiving, transmitting,and/or otherwise communicating data or information in a networkenvironment. This may be inclusive of appropriate algorithms andcommunication protocols that allow for the effective exchange of data orinformation.

In regards to the internal structure associated with communicationsystem 10 a (and 10 b), each of electronic device 12 a, server 14, andcloud 16 can include memory elements for storing information to be usedin the operations outlined herein. Each of electronic device 12 a,server 14, and cloud 16 may keep information in any suitable memoryelement (e.g., random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM),erasable programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmableROM (EEPROM), application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), etc.),software, hardware, firmware, or in any other suitable component,device, element, or object where appropriate and based on particularneeds. Any of the memory items discussed herein should be construed asbeing encompassed within the broad term ‘memory element.’ Moreover, theinformation being used, tracked, sent, or received in communicationsystem 10 a (and 10 b) could be provided in any database, register,queue, table, cache, control list, or other storage structure, all ofwhich can be referenced at any suitable timeframe. Any such storageoptions may also be included within the broad term ‘memory element’ asused herein.

In certain example implementations, the functions outlined herein may beimplemented by logic encoded in one or more tangible media (e.g.,embedded logic provided in an ASIC, digital signal processor (DSP)instructions, software (potentially inclusive of object code and sourcecode) to be executed by a processor, or other similar machine, etc.),which may be inclusive of non-transitory computer-readable media. Insome of these instances, memory elements can store data used for theoperations described herein. This includes the memory elements beingable to store software, logic, code, or processor instructions that areexecuted to carry out the activities described herein.

In an example implementation, network elements of communication system10 a (and 10 b), such as electronic device 12 a, server 14, and cloud 16may include software modules (e.g., integrity verification modules 26 a,26 b, and 26 c respectively) to achieve, or to foster, operations asoutlined herein. These modules may be suitably combined in anyappropriate manner, which may be based on particular configurationand/or provisioning needs. In example embodiments, such operations maybe carried out by hardware, implemented externally to these elements, orincluded in some other network device to achieve the intendedfunctionality. Furthermore, the modules can be implemented as software,hardware, firmware, or any suitable combination thereof. These elementsmay also include software (or reciprocating software) that cancoordinate with other network elements in order to achieve theoperations, as outlined herein.

Additionally, each of electronic device 12 a, server 14, and cloud 16may include a processor that can execute software or an algorithm toperform activities as discussed herein. A processor can execute any typeof instructions associated with the data to achieve the operationsdetailed herein. In one example, the processors could transform anelement or an article (e.g., data) from one state or thing to anotherstate or thing. In another example, the activities outlined herein maybe implemented with fixed logic or programmable logic (e.g.,software/computer instructions executed by a processor) and the elementsidentified herein could be some type of a programmable processor,programmable digital logic (e.g., a field programmable gate array(FPGA), an EPROM, an EEPROM) or an ASIC that includes digital logic,software, code, electronic instructions, or any suitable combinationthereof. Any of the potential processing elements, modules, and machinesdescribed herein should be construed as being encompassed within thebroad term ‘processor.’

Electronic device 12 a can be a network element and includes, forexample, desktop computers, laptop computers, mobile devices, personaldigital assistants, smartphones, tablets, or other similar devices.Security server 14 can be a network element such as a server or virtualserver and can be associated with clients, customers, endpoints, or endusers wishing to initiate a communication in communication system 10 a(and 10 b) via some network (e.g., network 18). The term ‘server’ isinclusive of devices used to serve the requests of clients and/orperform some computational task on behalf of clients withincommunication system 10 a (and 10 b). Although integrity verificationmodules 26 a, 26 b, and 26 c are represented in FIG. 1 as being locatedin electronic device 12 a, security server 14, and cloud 16 respectivelythis is for illustrative purposes only. Integrity verification modules26 a, 26 b, and 26 c could be combined or separated in any suitableconfiguration. Furthermore, integrity verification modules 26 a, 26 b,and 26 c could be integrated with or distributed in another networkaccessible by electronic device 12 a. Cloud 16 is configured to providecloud services to electronic device 12 a. Cloud services may generallybe defined as the use of computing resources that are delivered as aservice over a network, such as the Internet. Typically, compute,storage, and network resources are offered in a cloud infrastructure,effectively shifting the workload from a local network to the cloudnetwork.

Turning to FIG. 2, FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of acommunication system 10 b for data verification using enclaveattestation in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.Communication system 10 b can include an electronic device 12 b.Electronic device 12 b can include an enclave 20 b. Enclave 20 b caninclude an enclave integrity verification module 32. Enclave integrityverification module 32 can include input data attestation library 30.Enclave integrity verification module 32 is similarly configured asintegrity verification module 26 a and allows enclave 20 b to performdata verification within enclave 20 b and can be thought of as anenclave within an enclave. Attestation channels 28 b and 28 c can beused to update input data attestation library 30 in enclave integrityverification module 32.

Turning to FIG. 3, FIG. 3 FIG. 3 is an example flowchart illustratingpossible operations of a flow 300 that may be associated with dataverification using enclave attestation, in accordance with anembodiment. At 302, an application is created with a flag (or some otherindicator) that indicates the application is to be used with integrityverification. For example, a developer may create an application and thedeveloper may want the application to be used with an enclave to enableintegrity verification. Instead of writing the code to enable theintegrity verification, the developer can just set the flag and thesystem will recognize that the application is to be used with integrityverification. At 304, a whitelist associated with the application iscreated. The whitelist can include trusted applications and processesassociated with the application. At 306, the application is communicatedto the enclave. At 308, the whitelist is communicated to an integrityverification module. For example, the whitelist may be stored in inputdata attestation library 30 and can be used for data verification.During operation, an untrusted application or service may supplyuntrusted data to the application. The enclave can use the attestationchannel to validate the untrusted data prior to use of the untrusteddata by the enclave.

Turning to FIG. 4, FIG. 4 is an example flowchart illustrating possibleoperations of a flow 400 that may be associated with data verificationusing enclave attestation, in accordance with an embodiment. In anembodiment, one or more operations of flow 400 may be performed byintegrity verification module 26 a, 26 b, 26 c or enclave integrityverification module 32. At 402, an application is loaded into anenclave. At 404, the system determines if the application has a flag (orsome other indicator) that indicates the application is to be used withintegrity verification. If the application does not have a flag thatindicates the application is to be used with integrity verification,then the process ends. If the application does have a flag thatindicates the application is to be used with integrity verification,then an attestation channel is established between the enclave and anintegrity verification module, as in 406. At 408, untrusted data isreceived by the application in the enclave. At 410, using theattestation channel, the enclave requests verification of the untrusteddata from the integrity verification module. At 412, the systemdetermines if the untrusted data is verified. If the untrusted data wasverified (by the integrity verification module), then the untrusted datais allowed, as in 414. If the untrusted data was not verified (by theintegrity verification module), then the untrusted data is not allowed,as in 418 and a report is generated regarding the untrusted data, as in416.

Turning to FIG. 5, FIG. 5 is an example flowchart illustrating possibleoperations of a flow 500 that may be associated with data verificationusing enclave attestation, in accordance with an embodiment. In anembodiment, one or more operations of flow 500 may be performed byintegrity verification module 26 a, 26 b, 26 c or enclave integrityverification module 32. At 502, an attestation channel is establishedbetween an enclave and an integrity verification module. At 504, theintegrity verification module receives a request for verification of(untrusted) data from the enclave. At 506, the system determines if thedata is included in a whitelist. For example, an integrity verificationmodule may determine if the data is included in an input dataattestation library. If the data is not included in the whitelist, thenthe data is not allowed, as in 512 and a report is generated as in 514.If the data is included in the whitelist, then the system determines ifthe data satisfies a policy related to the enclave, as in 508. Forexample, the system may determine if the data satisfies one or more dataintegrity analysis checks. If the data does not satisfy a policy relatedto the enclave, then the data is not verified, as in 512. If the datadoes satisfy a policy related to the enclave, then the data is verified,as in 510 and a report is generated as in 514.

Turning to FIG. 6, FIG. 6 is an example flowchart illustrating possibleoperations of a flow 600 that may be associated with data verificationusing enclave attestation, in accordance with an embodiment. In anembodiment, one or more operations of flow 600 may be performed byintegrity verification module 26 a, 26 b, 26 c or enclave integrityverification module 32. At 602, an attestation channel is establishedbetween an enclave and an integrity verification module. At 604, theintegrity verification module creates an integrity verificationapplication that conforms to a policy associated with the enclave. At606, the integrity verification application is communicated to theenclave using the attestation channel. This process allows dataverification to be performed locally on an electronic device and allowsthe data verification to be easily updated.

FIG. 7 illustrates a computing system 700 that is arranged in apoint-to-point (PtP) configuration according to an embodiment. Inparticular, FIG. 7 shows a system where processors, memory, andinput/output devices are interconnected by a number of point-to-pointinterfaces. Generally, one or more of the network elements ofcommunication system 10 may be configured in the same or similar manneras computing system 700.

As illustrated in FIG. 7, system 700 may include several processors, ofwhich only two, processors 770 and 780, are shown for clarity. While twoprocessors 770 and 780 are shown, it is to be understood that anembodiment of system 700 may also include only one such processor.Processors 770 and 780 may each include a set of cores (i.e., processorcores 774A and 774B and processor cores 784A and 784B) to executemultiple threads of a program. The cores may be configured to executeinstruction code in a manner similar to that discussed above withreference to FIGS. 1-6. Each processor 770, 780 may include at least oneshared cache 771, 781. Shared caches 771, 781 may store data (e.g.,instructions) that are utilized by one or more components of processors770, 780, such as processor cores 774 and 784.

Processors 770 and 780 may also each include integrated memorycontroller logic (MC) 772 and 782 to communicate with memory elements732 and 734. Memory elements 732 and/or 734 may store various data usedby processors 770 and 780. In alternative embodiments, memory controllerlogic 772 and 782 may be discrete logic separate from processors 770 and780.

Processors 770 and 780 may be any type of processor and may exchangedata via a point-to-point (PtP) interface 750 using point-to-pointinterface circuits 778 and 788, respectively. Processors 770 and 780 mayeach exchange data with a chipset 790 via individual point-to-pointinterfaces 752 and 754 using point-to-point interface circuits 776, 786,794, and 798. Chipset 790 may also exchange data with a high-performancegraphics circuit 738 via a high-performance graphics interface 739,using an interface circuit 792, which could be a PtP interface circuit.In alternative embodiments, any or all of the PtP links illustrated inFIG. 7 could be implemented as a multi-drop bus rather than a PtP link.

Chipset 790 may be in communication with a bus 720 via an interfacecircuit 796. Bus 720 may have one or more devices that communicate overit, such as a bus bridge 718 and I/O devices 716. Via a bus 710, busbridge 718 may be in communication with other devices such as akeyboard/mouse 712 (or other input devices such as a touch screen,trackball, etc.), communication devices 726 (such as modems, networkinterface devices, or other types of communication devices that maycommunicate through a computer network 760), audio I/O devices 714,and/or a data storage device 728. Data storage device 728 may store code730, which may be executed by processors 770 and/or 780. In alternativeembodiments, any portions of the bus architectures could be implementedwith one or more PtP links.

The computer system depicted in FIG. 7 is a schematic illustration of anembodiment of a computing system that may be utilized to implementvarious embodiments discussed herein. It will be appreciated thatvarious components of the system depicted in FIG. 7 may be combined in asystem-on-a-chip (SoC) architecture or in any other suitableconfiguration. For example, embodiments disclosed herein can beincorporated into systems including mobile devices such as smartcellular telephones, tablet computers, personal digital assistants,portable gaming devices, etc. It will be appreciated that these mobiledevices may be provided with SoC architectures in at least someembodiments.

Turning to FIG. 8, FIG. 8 is a simplified block diagram associated withan example ARM ecosystem SOC 800 of the present disclosure. At least oneexample implementation of the present disclosure can include the dataverification features discussed herein and an ARM component. Forexample, the example of FIG. 8 can be associated with any ARM core(e.g., A-9, A-15, etc.). Further, the architecture can be part of anytype of tablet, smartphone (inclusive of Android™ phones, iPhones™),iPad™, Google Nexus™, Microsoft Surface™, personal computer, server,video processing components, laptop computer (inclusive of any type ofnotebook), Ultrabook™ system, any type of touch-enabled input device,etc.

In this example of FIG. 8, ARM ecosystem SOC 800 may include multiplecores 806-807, an L2 cache control 808, a bus interface unit 809, an L2cache 810, a graphics processing unit (GPU) 815, an interconnect 802, avideo codec 820, and a liquid crystal display (LCD) I/F 825, which maybe associated with mobile industry processor interface(MIPI)/high-definition multimedia interface (HDMI) links that couple toan LCD.

ARM ecosystem SOC 800 may also include a subscriber identity module(SIM) I/F 830, a boot read-only memory (ROM) 835, a synchronous dynamicrandom access memory (SDRAM) controller 840, a flash controller 845, aserial peripheral interface (SPI) master 850, a suitable power control855, a dynamic RAM (DRAM) 860, and flash 865. In addition, one or moreexample embodiments include one or more communication capabilities,interfaces, and features such as instances of Bluetooth™ 870, a 3G modem875, a global positioning system (GPS) 880, and an 802.11 Wi-Fi 885.

In operation, the example of FIG. 8 can offer processing capabilities,along with relatively low power consumption to enable computing ofvarious types (e.g., mobile computing, high-end digital home, servers,wireless infrastructure, etc.). In addition, such an architecture canenable any number of software applications (e.g., Android™, Adobe®Flash® Player, Java Platform Standard Edition (Java SE), JavaFX, Linux,Microsoft Windows Embedded, Symbian and Ubuntu, etc.). In at least oneexample embodiment, the core processor may implement an out-of-ordersuperscalar pipeline with a coupled low-latency level-2 cache.

FIG. 9 illustrates a processor core 900 according to an embodiment.Processor core 900 may be the core for any type of processor, such as amicro-processor, an embedded processor, a digital signal processor(DSP), a network processor, or other device to execute code. Althoughonly one processor core 900 is illustrated in FIG. 9, a processor mayalternatively include more than one of the processor core 900illustrated in FIG. 9. For example, processor core 900 represents oneexample embodiment of processors cores 774 a, 774 b, 774 a, and 774 bshown and described with reference to processors 770 and 780 of FIG. 7.Processor core 900 may be a single-threaded core or, for at least oneembodiment, processor core 900 may be multithreaded in that it mayinclude more than one hardware thread context (or “logical processor”)per core.

FIG. 9 also illustrates a memory 902 coupled to processor core 900 inaccordance with an embodiment. Memory 902 may be any of a wide varietyof memories (including various layers of memory hierarchy) as are knownor otherwise available to those of skill in the art. Memory 902 mayinclude code 904, which may be one or more instructions, to be executedby processor core 900. Processor core 900 can follow a program sequenceof instructions indicated by code 904. Each instruction enters afront-end logic 906 and is processed by one or more decoders 908. Thedecoder may generate, as its output, a micro operation such as a fixedwidth micro operation in a predefined format, or may generate otherinstructions, microinstructions, or control signals that reflect theoriginal code instruction. Front-end logic 906 also includes registerrenaming logic 910 and scheduling logic 912, which generally allocateresources and queue the operation corresponding to the instruction forexecution.

Processor core 900 can also include execution logic 914 having a set ofexecution units 916-1 through 916-N. Some embodiments may include anumber of execution units dedicated to specific functions or sets offunctions. Other embodiments may include only one execution unit or oneexecution unit that can perform a particular function. Execution logic914 performs the operations specified by code instructions.

After completion of execution of the operations specified by the codeinstructions, back-end logic 918 can retire the instructions of code904. In one embodiment, processor core 900 allows out of order executionbut requires in order retirement of instructions. Retirement logic 920may take a variety of known forms (e.g., re-order buffers or the like).In this manner, processor core 900 is transformed during execution ofcode 904, at least in terms of the output generated by the decoder,hardware registers and tables utilized by register renaming logic 910,and any registers (not shown) modified by execution logic 914.

Although not illustrated in FIG. 9, a processor may include otherelements on a chip with processor core 900, at least some of which wereshown and described herein with reference to FIG. 7. For example, asshown in FIG. 7, a processor may include memory control logic along withprocessor core 900. The processor may include I/O control logic and/ormay include I/O control logic integrated with memory control logic.

Note that with the examples provided herein, interaction may bedescribed in terms of two, three, or more network elements. However,this has been done for purposes of clarity and example only. In certaincases, it may be easier to describe one or more of the functionalitiesof a given set of flows by only referencing a limited number of networkelements. It should be appreciated that communication system 10 a and 10b and their teachings are readily scalable and can accommodate a largenumber of components, as well as more complicated/sophisticatedarrangements and configurations. Accordingly, the examples providedshould not limit the scope or inhibit the broad teachings ofcommunication system 10 a and 10 b as potentially applied to a myriad ofother architectures.

It is also important to note that the operations in the preceding flowdiagrams (i.e., FIGS. 3-6) illustrate only some of the possiblecorrelating scenarios and patterns that may be executed by, or within,communication system 10 a and 10 b. Some of these operations may bedeleted or removed where appropriate, or these operations may bemodified or changed considerably without departing from the scope of thepresent disclosure. In addition, a number of these operations have beendescribed as being executed concurrently with, or in parallel to, one ormore additional operations. However, the timing of these operations maybe altered considerably. The preceding operational flows have beenoffered for purposes of example and discussion. Substantial flexibilityis provided by communication system 10 a and 10 b in that any suitablearrangements, chronologies, configurations, and timing mechanisms may beprovided without departing from the teachings of the present disclosure.

Although the present disclosure has been described in detail withreference to particular arrangements and configurations, these exampleconfigurations and arrangements may be changed significantly withoutdeparting from the scope of the present disclosure. Moreover, certaincomponents may be combined, separated, eliminated, or added based onparticular needs and implementations. Additionally, althoughcommunication system 10 a and 10 b have been illustrated with referenceto particular elements and operations that facilitate the communicationprocess, these elements and operations may be replaced by any suitablearchitecture, protocols, and/or processes that achieve the intendedfunctionality of communication system 10 a or 10 b.

Numerous other changes, substitutions, variations, alterations, andmodifications may be ascertained to one skilled in the art and it isintended that the present disclosure encompass all such changes,substitutions, variations, alterations, and modifications as fallingwithin the scope of the appended claims. In order to assist the UnitedStates Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and, additionally, anyreaders of any patent issued on this application in interpreting theclaims appended hereto, Applicant wishes to note that the Applicant: (a)does not intend any of the appended claims to invoke paragraph six (6)of 35 U.S.C. section 112 as it exists on the date of the filing hereofunless the words “means for” or “step for” are specifically used in theparticular claims; and (b) does not intend, by any statement in thespecification, to limit this disclosure in any way that is not otherwisereflected in the appended claims.

OTHER NOTES AND EXAMPLES

Example C1 is at least one machine readable storage medium having one ormore instructions that when executed by at least one processor cause theat least one processor to receive untrusted data at an enclave in anelectronic device, isolate the untrusted data from at least a portion ofthe enclave, communicate at least a portion of the untrusted data to anintegrity verification module using an attestation channel, and receivedata integrity verification of the untrusted data from the integrityverification module.

In Example C2, the subject matter of Example C1 can optionally includewhere the integrity verification module performs data integrityattestation functions to verify the untrusted data.

In Example C3, the subject matter of any one of Examples C1-C2 canoptionally include where the data integrity attestation functionsinclude a data attestation policy.

In Example C4, the subject matter of any one of Examples C1-C3 canoptionally include where the data integrity attestation functionsinclude a whitelist.

In Example C5, the subject matter of any one of Examples C1-C4 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located inthe electronic device.

In Example C6, the subject matter of any one of Example C1-05 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located inthe enclave.

In Example C7, the subject matter of any one of Examples C1-C6 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located ina server that is remote from the electronic device.

In Example C8, the subject matter of any one of Examples C1-C7 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located ina cloud that is remote from the electronic device.

In Example A1, an apparatus can include an integrity verificationmodule, where the integrity verification module is configured to receiveuntrusted data from an enclave in an electronic device, where theuntrusted data is isolated from at least a portion of the enclave, wherethe untrusted data is communicated using an attestation channel, performdata integrity verification of the untrusted input data, and return theresults of the data integrity verification to the enclave.

In Example, A2, the subject matter of Example A1 can optionally includewhere the integrity verification module is further configured to performdata integrity attestation functions to verify the untrusted data.

In Example A3, the subject matter of any one of Examples A1-A2 canoptionally include where the data integrity attestation functionsinclude a data attestation policy.

In Example A4, the subject matter of any one of Examples A1-A3 canoptionally include where the data integrity attestation functionsinclude a whitelist.

In Example A5, the subject matter of any one of Examples A1-A4 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located inthe electronic device.

In Example A6, the subject matter of any one of Examples A1-A5 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located inthe enclave.

In Example A7, the subject matter of any one of Examples A1-A6 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located ina server that is remote from the electronic device.

In Example A8, the subject matter of any one of Examples A1-A7 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located ina cloud that is remote from the electronic device.

Example M1 is a method including receiving untrusted input data at anenclave in an electronic device, isolating the untrusted input data fromat least a portion of the enclave, communicating at least a portion ofthe untrusted data to an integrity verification module using anattestation channel, and receiving data integrity verification of theuntrusted input data from the integrity verification module.

In Example M2, the subject matter of Example M1 can optionally includewhere the integrity verification module performs data integrityattestation functions to verify the untrusted data.

In Example M3, the subject matter of any one of the Examples M1-M2 canoptionally include where the data integrity attestation functionsinclude a data attestation policy.

In Example M4, the subject matter of any one of the Examples M1-M3 canoptionally include where the data integrity attestation functionsinclude a whitelist.

In Example M5, the subject matter of any one of the Examples M1-M4 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located inthe electronic device.

In Example M6, the subject matter of any one of the Examples M1-M5 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located ina server that is remote from the electronic device.

In Example M7, the subject matter of any one of the Examples M1-M6 canoptionally include where the integrity verification module is located ina cloud that is remote from the electronic device.

Example S1 is a system for data verification using enclave attestation,the system including an integrity verification module configured forreceiving untrusted input data at an enclave in an electronic device,isolating the untrusted input data from at least a portion of theenclave, communicating at least a portion of the untrusted data to anintegrity verification module using an attestation channel, andreceiving data integrity verification of the untrusted input data fromthe integrity verification module.

In Example S2, the subject matter of Example S1 can optionally includewhere the integrity verification module performs data integrityattestation functions to verify the untrusted data and the dataintegrity attestation functions include a data attestation policy.

Example X1 is a machine-readable storage medium includingmachine-readable instructions to implement a method or realize anapparatus as in any one of the Examples A1-A8, or M1-M7. Example Y1 isan apparatus comprising means for performing of any of the Examplemethods M1-M7. In Example Y2, the subject matter of Example Y1 canoptionally include the means for performing the method comprising aprocessor and a memory. In Example Y3, the subject matter of Example Y2can optionally include the memory comprising machine-readableinstructions.

1.-25. (canceled)
 26. At least one non-transitory computer-readablemedium comprising one or more instructions that when executed by aprocessor cause the processor to: receive untrusted data for input to anapplication residing in a protected region of memory of an electronicdevice; isolate the untrusted data for input from the protected regionof memory; communicate at least a portion of the untrusted data forinput over an attestation channel for data integrity verification by adata integrity attestation function that includes a data attestationpolicy specifying constraints on input values for the application;receive data integrity verification of the untrusted data for input viathe attestation channel; and return the verified untrusted data forinput to the application for processing.
 27. The at least onenon-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 26, wherein the dataintegrity attestation function further includes a whitelist.
 28. The atleast one non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 26, whereinthe application further includes an indicator that indicates theapplication is to be used with data integrity verification.
 29. The atleast one non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 26, whereinthe data integrity attestation function is located in the electronicdevice.
 30. The at least one non-transitory computer-readable medium ofclaim 26, wherein the data integrity attestation function is located inthe protected region of memory.
 31. The at least one non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 26, wherein the data integrityattestation function is located in a server that is remote from theelectronic device.
 32. The at least one non-transitory computer-readablemedium of claim 26, wherein the data integrity attestation function islocated in a cloud that is remote from the electronic device.
 33. Anapparatus comprising: memory, wherein the memory comprises a protectedregion; and a processor, the processor configured to: receive untrusteddata for input to an application residing in a protected region ofmemory of an electronic device; isolate the untrusted data for inputfrom the protected region of memory; communicate at least a portion ofthe untrusted data for input over an attestation channel for dataintegrity verification by a data integrity attestation function thatincludes a data attestation policy specifying constraints on inputvalues for the application; receive data integrity verification of theuntrusted data for input via the attestation channel; and return theverified untrusted data for input to the application for processing. 34.The apparatus of claim 33, wherein the data integrity attestationfunction further includes a whitelist.
 35. The apparatus of claim 33,wherein the application further includes an indicator that indicates theapplication is to be used with data integrity verification.
 36. Theapparatus of claim 33, wherein the data integrity attestation functionis located in the electronic device.
 37. The apparatus of claim 33,wherein the data integrity attestation function is located in theprotected region of memory.
 38. The apparatus of claim 33, wherein thedata integrity attestation function is located in a server that isremote from the electronic device.
 39. The apparatus of claim 33,wherein the data integrity attestation function is located in a cloudthat is remote from the electronic device.
 40. A method comprising:receiving untrusted data for input to an application residing in aprotected region of memory of an electronic device; isolating theuntrusted data for input from the protected region of memory;communicating at least a portion of the untrusted data for input over anattestation channel for data integrity verification by a data integrityattestation function that includes a data attestation policy specifyingconstraints on input values for the application; receiving dataintegrity verification of the untrusted data for input via theattestation channel; and returning the verified untrusted data for inputto the application for processing.
 41. The method of claim 40, whereinthe data integrity attestation function further includes a whitelist.42. The method of claim 40, wherein the application further includes anindicator that indicates the application is to be used with dataintegrity verification.
 43. The method of claim 40, wherein the dataintegrity attestation function is located in the electronic device. 44.The method of claim 40, wherein the data integrity attestation functionis located in the protected region of memory.
 45. The method of claim40, wherein the data integrity attestation function is located in aserver that is remote from the electronic device.
 46. The method ofclaim 40, wherein the data integrity attestation function is located ina cloud that is remote from the electronic device.
 47. A system for dataintegrity verification, the system comprising: memory, wherein thememory comprises a protected region; and a processor, the processorconfigured for: receiving untrusted data for input to an applicationresiding in a protected region of memory of an electronic device;isolating the untrusted data for input from the protected region ofmemory; communicating at least a portion of the untrusted data for inputover an attestation channel for data integrity verification by a dataintegrity attestation function that includes a data attestation policyspecifying constraints on input values for the application; receivingdata integrity verification of the untrusted data for input via theattestation channel; and returning the verified untrusted data for inputto the application for processing.
 48. The system of claim 47, whereinthe data integrity attestation function further includes a whitelist.49. The system of claim 47, wherein the application further includes anindicator that indicates the application is to be used with dataintegrity verification.
 50. The system of claim 47, wherein the dataintegrity attestation function is located in a cloud that is remote fromthe electronic device.